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The ﬁnite stage dynamic n-person games with transferable payoﬀs are considered. The
cooperative version of the game is deﬁned, and a new approach for constructing characteristic
functions in multistage games based on characteristic functions deﬁned in stage games is
proposed. It is proved that the values of this new characteristic function dominate the values
of characteristic function constructed using the min-max approach. This allows constructing
the subcore of the classical core in the multistage game under consideration and guarantees
that this new approach leads to time-consistent (works L. Petrosyan, G. Zaccour, 2003;
L. Petrosyan, 1991) and in some cases strongly time-consistent solutions (paper L. Petrosyan,
1993). The example is provided showing the construction of this newly deﬁned characteristic
function and the time-consistency and strong time-consistency of the core.
Keywords: multistage game, characteristic function, time-consistency, strongly time-consis-
tency.
Introduction. There are many ways to deﬁne characteristic function in cooperative
games. For one stage games in recent literature characteristic function is deﬁned
axiomatically. In the same time this approach is diﬃcult to use for multistage dynamic
games since for solution of cooperative version of dynamic games the evolution of
characteristic function plays important role. In this paper we try to deﬁne the characteristic
function in multistage game using the characteristic function in stage game, this
approach seems to be eﬀective from computational point of view. Also the newly deﬁned
characteristic function outnumbers the value of classical characteristic function in each
stage game. This gives the possibility of constructing time-consistent and strongly time
consistent solution concepts using non-negative imputation distribution procedure (IDP).
Main result. In the paper a ﬁnite multistage game G(z1), which starts from one
stage game Γ(z1) in vertex z1 of game tree G¯ is considered. Denote by Γ(z) one stage
game in vertex z of game tree G(z):
Γ(z) = <N ;Uz1 , . . . ,Uzi , . . . ,Uzn;Kz1 , . . . ,Kzi , . . . ,Kzn > . (1)
In formula (1) N is a set of players, which is the same for all games Γ(z), z ∈ G¯, Uzi is
the set of strategies of player i ∈ N and Kzi is a payoﬀ function of player i. The case, when
the game Γ(z) is ﬁnite, i. e. the sets Uzi are ﬁnite, is considered.
During the game G(z1) a ﬁnite sequence of one stage games
Γ(z1), . . . ,Γ(zk), . . . ,Γ(zl)
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is realized. Here if the stage game Γ(zk) takes place the next stage game Γ(zk+1) occurs
in the vertex zk+1 = T (zk;uzk1 , . . . , uzkn ) dependent on the stage zk and strategies of players
uzk = (uzk1 , . . . , uzkn ) chosen in stage game Γ(zk). Under the strategy of player i ∈ N in game
G(z1) we understand the mapping ui(⋅), which determines the player’s i ∈ N choice in each
possible one stage game, i. e. ui(z) = uzi ∈ Uzi . Each strategy proﬁle u = (u1(⋅), . . . , un(⋅))
uniquely determines the trajectory z = (z1, . . . , zl) and the payoﬀs of players as sums of
their payoﬀs in corresponding stage games.
Strategy proﬁle u¯ = (u¯1(⋅), . . . , u¯n(⋅)), which maximizes the sum of players playoﬀs in
game G(z1), we will call “cooperative strategy proﬁle”. This cooperative strategy proﬁle
generates a sequence of one stage games Γ(z¯1),Γ(z¯2), . . . ,Γ(z¯l), and corresponding path
z¯ = (z¯1, . . . , z¯l), which we will call cooperative trajectory.
We are interested in subgames of game G(z¯1) along cooperative trajectory
G(z¯1),G(z¯2), . . . ,G(z¯l),
each of them starts from one stage game Γ(z¯k), k = 1, . . . , l.
Consider cooperative version of game G(z¯1) and subgames G(z¯k), k = 1, . . . , l.
Let V¯ (z¯k, S), S ⊂ N , be a characteristic function in subgame G(z¯k), which is deﬁned
in classical sense [1], i. e. as a lower value of zero-sum game G(z¯k) between coalition S
and coalition N/S, where coalition S is the ﬁrst player and N/S is the second with payoﬀ
of coalition S equal to the sum of payoﬀs of its members. Also deﬁne the characteristic
function V (z,S), S ⊂ N , in one stage game Γ(z) in a classical way as a lower value of
zero-sum game associated with Γ(z) between coalition S as ﬁrst player and coalition N/S
as second.
Deﬁne W (S), S ⊂ N , as follows: W (S) =max
z
V (z,S), S ⊂ N.
Denote by C¯(z¯k) the core in multistage game G(z¯k), and by C(z¯k) the core in one
stage game Γ(z¯k), which realizes in stage k in vertex z¯k and D(z¯k) the set of imputations
αz¯k = (αz¯k1 , . . . , αz¯kn ) in Γ(z¯k), satisfying the condition
∑
i∈S
αz¯ki ⩾W (S), S ⊂ N, S ≠N,
∑
i∈N
αz¯ki = V (z¯k,N),
here V (z¯k,N) is sum of players payoﬀs in the game Γ(z¯k), when players use the cooperative
strategy proﬁle in G(z¯k). Suppose that C(z¯k) ≠ ∅, C¯(z¯k) ≠ ∅ and D(z¯k) ≠ ∅. The last




W¯ (z¯k, S) = (l − k + 1)W (S), (2)
where l is a number of stages in game G(z1). Formula (2) deﬁnes a new characteristic
function in multistage game G(z1), based on the analogue of characteristic function W (S)
of one stage game Γ(z). Consider the set D¯(z¯k) as a set of imputations αz¯k = (αz¯k1 , . . . , αz¯kn )
in game G(z¯k) such that
∑
i∈S
αz¯ki ⩾ W¯ (z¯k, S), S ⊂ N, S ≠ N,
∑
i∈N
αz¯ki = V¯ (z¯k,N).
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Suppose that the condition
max
z
V (z,S) =W (S) < V (z,N) = V (N), z ∈ G(z1), S ≠ N,
is satisﬁed. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. The inclusion
D¯(z¯k) ⊂ C¯(z¯k) (3)
is true.
Proof. Since C¯(z¯k) is the set of all imputations αz¯k = (αz¯k1 , . . . , αz¯kn ) in the cooperative
version of the multistage subgame G(z¯k) such that
∑
i∈S
αz¯ki ⩾ V¯ (z¯k, S), S ⊂N, S ≠N ∑
i∈N
αz¯ki = V¯ (z¯k,N).
To prove (3) it is suﬃcient to prove
V¯ (z¯k, S) ⩽ W¯ (z¯k, S), k = 1, . . . , l, S ⊂ N. (4)
We prove (4) by induction on number of stages l in subgame G(z¯k). Suppose l = 1,
then we have the subgame G(z¯l), which coincides with one stage game Γ(z¯l). Obviously in
this case V (z¯l, S) =W (S), since all subgames of G(z¯l) contain only one vertex z¯l. Consider
a less trivial case l = 2. Then for lower value V (z¯l−1, S) we have the following analogue of
Bellman equation:






K z¯l−1i (u1, . . . , un) + V¯ (z¯l, S))] ,
where z¯l = T (z¯l−1;u1, . . . , un), or






K z¯l−1i (u1, . . . , un) + V¯ (T (z¯l−1;u1, . . . , un), S))] ,
but
V¯ (z¯l, S) = V (z¯l, S) ⩽max
z
V (z,S) =W (S)
and we get






K z¯l−1i (u1, . . . , un) +W (S))] =






K z¯l−1i (u1, . . . , un))] =
=W (S) + V (z¯l−1, S) ⩽W (S) +max
z
V (z,S) = 2W (S) = W¯ (z¯l−1, S).
Suppose the theorem is true for all l − k stage subgame. Then we can write






K z¯l−ki (u1, . . . , un) + V¯ (T (z¯l−k;u1, . . . , un), S))] .
By induction hypotheses
V¯ (T (z¯l−k;u1, . . . , un), S) = V¯ (z¯l−k+1, S) ⩽ W¯ (z¯l−k+1, S) = (l − k)W (S).
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This gives us






K z¯ki (u1, . . . , un) + (l − k)W (S))] =






K z¯ki (u1, . . . , un))] ⩽
⩽ (l − k)W (S) +max
z
V (z,S) = (l − k)W (S) +W (S) =
= (l − k + 1)W (S) = W¯ (z¯k, S).
The theorem is proved.
Deﬁnition 1. The ﬁnite sequence of vectors β = (β1, . . . , βi, . . . , βn) is called IDP in
G(z1) for an imputation α = (α1, . . . , αn), if αi = l∑
k=1
βik, where βi = (βi1, . . . , βik, . . . , βil)
and k is the corresponding stage in the game G(z1).
The IDP β = (β1, . . . , βk. . . . , βl) is called time-consistent [2–5] for imputation αz¯1 ∈
D¯(z¯1) if for any 1 ⩽ k ⩽ l
l∑
m=k
βm = α¯z¯k ∈ D¯(z¯k).
It is clear that if we take sequence of imputations αz¯1 , αz¯2 , . . . , αz¯k , . . . , αz¯l , αz¯k ∈ D¯(z¯k),
k = 1, . . . , l, and deﬁne
βk = αz¯k − αz¯k+1 , k = 1, . . . , l − 1, βl = αz¯l , (5)
the IDP β = (β1, . . . , βk. . . . , βl) will be time-consistent IDP for αz¯1 ∈ D¯(z¯1). In some cases
it is important that βk ⩾ 0, k = 1, . . . , l. But in general the nonegativeity of IDP can not
be guaranteed. In our case the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. For any αz¯1 ∈ D¯(z¯1) there exist non-negative time-consistent IDP β(β > 0).
Proof. For each 1 ⩽ k ⩽ l we have
αz¯1 = k∑
m=1
βm + α¯z¯k+1 ,
which follows from (5) and time consistency of IDP β for imputation αz¯1 . Take βˆk = αz¯1
l
,
k = 1, . . . , l. Prove that βˆ = (βˆ1, . . . , βˆk, . . . , βˆl) is time-consistent IDP for αz¯k . Deﬁne
αˆz¯k = l − k + 1
l
αz¯1
and prove that αˆz¯k ∈ D¯(z¯k) or
∑
i∈S
l − k + 1
l
α¯z¯1 ⩾ (l + k − 1)W (S). (6)
Since αˆz¯1 ∈ D¯(z¯1) we have
∑
i∈S
αˆz¯1i ⩾ lW (S), ∑
i∈N
αˆz¯1i = lW (N). (7)
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Multiplying both sides of (7) on
l + k − 1
l
we get (6), which means that αˆz¯k ∈ D¯(z¯k),
k = 1, . . . , l. Then,




Deﬁnition 2. Set D¯(z¯1) is called strongly time consistent, if for each imputation
αz1 ∈ D¯(z¯1), there exist such IDP β = (β1, . . . , βk, . . . , βl), that D¯(z¯1) ⊃ k∑
j=1
βj ⊕ D¯(z¯k+1),
where the operation ⊕ means a⊕B = {a + b, b ∈ B}.
Theorem 3. Suppose V (z,N) = V (N) and is the same in all stage games. Under
this condition the set D¯(z¯1) is time-consistent and strongly time-consistent.
The theorem holds also in general case without requirement that V (z,N) is the same
for all stage games Γ(z), but the proof is more diﬃcult.
If the condition of theorem 3 holds W¯ (N) = lW (N) in G(z¯1). Suppose ξ¯1 ∈ D¯(z1),
then ∑
i∈S
ξ¯i1 ⩾ W¯ (z1, S) = lW (S),
∑
i∈N
ξ¯i1 = W¯ (z1,N) = lW (N). (8)










= W¯ (z1,N) =W (N).








and let ξ˜k+1 ∈ D¯(z¯k+1), then we can construct IDP β¯′ for the imputation ξ˜k+1

















lW (S) + (l − k)W (S) =
= kW (S) + (l − k)W (S) = lW (S)
and we get that ξˆ1 ∈ D¯(z1).
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Since imputation ξ˜k+1 ∈ D¯(z¯k+1) was arbitrary
k∑
j=1
β¯j ⊕ D¯(z¯k+1) ⊂ D¯(z¯1),
which proves strongly time-consistency of D¯(z¯1).
Example. Consider a three persons three stages game G(z1) starting from the vertex
z1, in which the stage game Γ(z1) is played. For each player i ∈ N = {1,2,3} the set of
strategies consists of two elements, which for simplicity we shall denote by {1,2}. The
payoﬀ function of players i ∈ N in Γ(z1) is deﬁne as shown on Fig. 1.
Figure 1. Game Γ(z1)
Notice: If players choose proﬁle (1,1,1), the payoﬀs are equal to (5,5,5).
If on the ﬁrst stage players 1 and 2 choose proﬁles (1,1) and (2,2) and player three
chooses arbitrary strategy k = 1,2 the game passes to the stage
z2 = T (z1; 1,1, k) = T (z1; 2,2, k), k = 1,2,
and on stage z2 the game Γ(z2) = Γ(z1) is played (the game Γ(z1) is repeated). If players
1 and 2 choose strategies (1,2) and (2,1) and player 3 chooses strategy 1 or 2 the game
passes to the stage
z′2 = T (z1; 1,2, k) = T (z1; 2,1, k), k = 1,2,
and at stage z′2 the new stage game Γ(z′2) is played. The payoﬀ function of players i ∈ N
is deﬁned as shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2. Game Γ(z′2)
In our example in games Γ(z1), Γ(z2) player 3 cannot change payoﬀs of players 1
and 2. This is done for simplicity.
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If in stages z2, z′2 players 1 and 2 choose proﬁles (1,1) or (2,2), the game passes to
the stage z3, where the following stage game Γ(z3) is played (Fig. 3). In either case the
stage z′3 is realized with the game Γ(z′3) played on this stage (Fig. 4).
Figure 3. Game Γ(z3)
Figure 4. Game Γ(z′3)
Thus, we have four diﬀerent stage games which can occur in the game G(z1). In the
Table we represent the values of characteristic functions for each of stage games.
Table. The values of characteristic functions
V (S) V (1) V (2) V (3) V (1,2) V (1,3) V (2,3) V (1,2,3)
Γ(z2) = Γ(z1) 1 1 5 10 6 6 16
Γ(z′2) 0 0 5 10 5 6 16
Γ(z3) 1 0 0 10 11 10 16
Γ(z′3) 0 0 0 10 9 5 16
By deﬁnition of W we have in this case
W (1) = 1, W (2) = 1, W (3) = 5,
W ({1,2}) = 10, W ({1,3}) = 11, W ({2,3}) = 10, W ({1,2,3}) = 16.
All possible trajectories in G(z1) are cooperative, since V (N) = 16 in each stage game
Γ(z). Thus, we have
W¯ (z¯1, S) = 3W (S),
W¯ (z¯2, S) = 2W (S),
W¯ (z¯3, S) =W (S).
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Denoting for simplicity W¯(z¯, S) by W¯(S), we get
W¯(1) = 3 ⋅ 1 = 3, W¯ (2) = 3 ⋅ 1 = 3, W¯ (3) = 3 ⋅ 5 = 15,
W¯ ({1,2}) = 3 ⋅ 10 = 30, W¯ ({1,3}) = 3 ⋅ 11 = 33, W¯ ({2,3}) = 3 ⋅ 10 = 30,
W¯ ({1,2,3}) = 3 ⋅ 16 = 48.
The analogue of the core D¯(z1) in this case coincides with the set of solutions of following
inequalities:
α1 ⩾ 3, α2 ⩾ 3, α3 ⩾ 15,
α1 +α2 ⩾ 30, α1 + α3 ⩾ 33, α2 +α3 ⩾ 30,
α1 +α2 +α3 = 48.
It is clear that the set D¯(z1) is not empty (one can take α1 = 15, α2 = 15, α3 = 18 or
α1 = 16, α2 = 15, α3 = 17). For each α ∈ D¯(z1) we can deﬁne IDP βk = α3 , k = 1,2,3, then
it is easily seen that D¯(z1) is strongly time-consistent.
Conclusion. In this paper we tried to deﬁne conditions under which a subset of
imputations from the core is time consistent and strongly time consistent in multistage
game. For this reason we introduce a new characteristic function which dominates the
values of characteristic function in the sense of the papers [6–9]. With the help of this
newly deﬁned characteristic function we construct the core and if it is not empty we prove
its time consistency and strongly time consistency. This condition is strong enough but it
holds in multistage games when stage games do not diﬀer much from each other and have
the same maximal joint payoﬀ.
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Новая характеристическая функция для многошаговых динамических игр
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тематика. Информатика. Процессы управления. 2018. Т. 14. Вып. 4. С. 316–324. https://
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В работе рассмотрены конечношаговые динамические игры n-лиц с трансферабельны-
ми выигрышами. Для таких игр разработана кооперативная версия игры и предложен
новый подход к построению характеристической функции на основе характеристиче-
ских функций, определенных в одновременных играх. Показано, что значения новой
характеристической функции для каждой коалиции превосходят величины характери-
стической функции, построенной на основе максиминного подхода. Последнее обстоя-
тельство позволяет использовать новую характеристическую функцию для построения
подъядра рассматриваемой многошаговой игры. Получены условия, которые гаранти-
руют, что этот новый подход приводит к динамически устойчивому (см. работы Л. Пет-
росяна, Д. Закура 2003 г. и Л. Петросяна 1993 г.) и в некоторых случаях к сильно дина-
мически устойчивому решению, которое совпадает с подъядром (статья Л. Петросяна
1993 г.). В работе приведен контрольный пример определения новой характеристиче-
ской функции и показана сильная динамическая устойчивость подъядра, построенного
с его помощью.
Ключевые слова: многошаговая игра, характеристическая функция, динамическая
устойчивость, сильная динамическая устойчивость.
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